HUB LAW OFFICES 1 Ford Greene, Esquire 711 Sir Francis Drake Boulevard San Anselmo, California 94960-1949 Telephone: (415) 258-0360 3 Attorney for Plaintiffs VICKI J. AZNARAN and RICHARD N. AZNARAN 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 Case No. CV-88-1786-JMI(EX) 10 VICKI J. AZNARAN and RICHARD N. 11 AZNARAN, PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION BAN ANBELMO, CALIFORNIA 94950-1949 12 AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM Plaintiffs, DEFAULT FOR FAILURE TO 711 BIR FRANCIS DRAKE BOULEVARD HUB LAW OFFICEB 13 TIMELY FILE OPPOSITION PAPERS VS. TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 14 JUDGMENT AND FOR ORDER CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF ALLOWING THE FILING OF SUCH CALIFORNIA, INC., et al. OPPOSITION PAPERS, INCLUDING 15 A MEMORANDUM IN EXCESS OF 35 Defendants. 16 PAGES; OR, IN THE FORD ALTERNATIVE, FOR RECONSIDER-17 ATION; DECLARATION OF AND RELATED COUNTER CLAIM POINTS AND COUNSEL; 16 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF 19 20 Date: Time: Ctrm: Hon. James M. Ideman 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 EXHIBIT A 084 28 PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION POR RELIEF FROM DEPAULT, OR FOR RECONSIDERATION

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	4	Attorney for Plaintiffs VICKI J. AZNARAN and RICHARD N. AZNARAN
	5	VICKI O. Manager
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	8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
	9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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	11	VICKI J. AZNARAN and RICHARD N.) Case No. CV-88-1786-JMI(Ex)
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2 0 0 0	14	VS. TIMELY FILE OPPOSITION PAPERS
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> m 4 = 2	15	CALIFORNIA, INC., et al. ALLOWING THE FILING OF SUCH
	16	Defendants - A MEMORANDUM IN EXCESS OF 35 PAGES; OR, IN THE
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BAN	18	AND RELATED COUNTER CLAIM ATION; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL; POINTS AND
	19	AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
	20	Date:
	21	Time: Ctrm: Hon. James M. Ideman
	22	
	23	TO DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
	24	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the day of December,
	25	1990, at 10:00 a.m., as soon as the matter can be considered by the
	26	Court, Plaintiffs Richard N. and Vicki J. Aznaran, will move the
	27	above entitled Court for an Order relieving them from default for
	28	EXHB! LA US?
		- DIGHT MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT, OR RECONSIDERATION, OR FOR RECONSIDERATION
		DARTE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT, OR THE

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summary judgment and for an Order allowing said Plaintiffs to file papers opposing Defendants' motion for summary judgment, including a memorandum in excess of 35 papers; or, in the alternative, for a reconsideration of its Order denying a continuance that was entered herein on November 30, 1990.

The legal basis for the portion of this motion directed to the failure to file a timely opposition are the provisions of F.R.C.P. Rules 1, 6(b)(2) and 7, and Local Rule 7.3.2. The factual portion of this motion directed toward relief from default is predicated on the facts that Plaintiffs' failure to file their opposition was due to the excusable neglect of their counsel who had sought an extension of time before the time to file such opposition had expired; that a critical member of his staff could not work due to the death of her mother; that Plaintiffs have proceeded and continue to proceed in good faith to litigate this cause; that Plaintiffs' opposition to the summary judgment motion has merit and to the grant the motion as though it were unopposed would work a great injustice on said Plaintiffs; and that the Court's grant of permission to file their opposition would not prejudice defendants. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Statement of Genuine Issues and Plaintiffs' Exhibits in support are submitted in conjunction with and as a part of the herein motion.


The portion of the motion directed toward obtaining permission to file a brief in excess of 35 pages is legally based on Local Rule 3.10 and relies on the factual predicate that Defendants' memorandum of points and authorities in support of their motion for summary judgment was 72 pages in length.

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The alternative portion of the motion directed at requesting the Court's reconsideration of its Order, entered on November 30, 1990, denying a continuance is based upon Local Rule 7.16 and the fact that after plaintiffs had submitted their papers dated November 14, 1990, on November 16, 1990, they received notice that the deposition of the leader of Scientology, David Miscavige, had been ordered by the Magistrate.

This Motion is based upon the herein notice, the declaration of counsel, the memorandum of points and authorities submitted herewith, the court files and records in this case, and upon such further supplemental and reply memoranda as are submitted in support of the motion.

DATED: December 10, 1990



Attorney for Plaintiffs RICHARD N. and VICKI J. AZNARAN

DECLARATION OF COUNSEL

FORD GREENE declares:

- I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the Courts of the State of California and am admitted to practice before this Court and am the attorney of record for plaintiffs herein.
- 2. On or about October 22, 1990 all defendants jointly filed their motion for summary judgment attacking all plaintiffs' claims with the sole exception of Count I, Vicki Aznaran's claim for false imprisonment. The matter was set for hearing on November 19, 1990. The memorandum in support of the summary judgment motion is 72 pages long, the separate statement is 16 pages in length, and 562 pages of EXHIBIT A 089
 - Page 3. Plaintiffs' ex parte motion for relief from default, or reconsideration, or for reconsideration

exhibits were filed in support thereof. Plaintiffs' opposition was initially to be filed and served on or before November 5, 1990.

- assistant, to negotiate with defense counsel in an effort to obtain more time to respond. On behalf of plaintiffs, Ms. Van Hoey requested defense counsel grant a continuance of the hearing date on the summary judgment for one month. Defense counsel would not agree, but did agree to continue the hearing to December 3, 1990, provided that plaintiffs' opposition was filed and served on or before November 13, 1990, even though such deadline provided defendants with a disproportionate advantage using the Local Rules as a reference point. I approved this agreement and instructed Ms. Van Hoey to confirm the same in writing; a copy of her confirming letter dated October 30, 1990 is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
- 4. Since on or about November 10, 1990 my legal assistant, Sarah Van Hoey, has been unable to work because on or about that date she advised me that day her mother died and Sarah would not be able to work for an indefinite period of time because would have to bury her mother in the midwest, and attend to all the matters of wrapping up her mother's estate. Not only was this a tremendous personal blow to my assistant, but also to my office. Sarah is very bright and very capable, among other things having recently contributed to a Callagan & Company publication on First Amendment litigation and having an article that has recently been or is about to be published in Los Angeles Lawyer Magazine. She was assigned almost exclusively to the herein case and one other major case in this office and worked with me extremely closely on all matters connected with this litigation. Having Sarah out of commission has wrecked havoc on my ability to

EXHIBIT A 090

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- 5. With Sarah's absence, on November 11 and 12, 1990, it became clear that an effective opposition to defendants 72 page summary judgment motion would take more time to prepare.
- morning electricity outage which prevented me from having Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application for Continuance of Hearing Date, Or, In the Alternative, For an Enlargement of Time to File Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting declaration and memorandum delivered to the Court by courier, I telecopied the same to Los Angeles for assistance in filing the same. A true and correct copy thereof is enclosed as Exhibit 2. In so doing, I forgot that the Court Clerk refused to accept telecopied signatures and neglected to leave the signature line blank and authorize the execution of my signature by the person receiving the telecopy for the purpose of filing it with the Court; I had executed the papers before they were telecopied. A true and correct copy of the Clerk's Civil Return Letter which accompanied the rejected motion is enclosed as Exhibit 3.
- 7. On November 14, 1990, I renewed my effort to obtain further time to file plaintiffs' opposition to the summary judgment motion by sending a renewed motion, slightly modified and augmented by an explanation of the prior day's events, by Federal Express to the Court. A true and correct copy thereof is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. The clerk rejected this filing because I had neglected to sign the proposed order. A true and correct copy of the Clerk's Civil Return Letter dated November 15, 1990 that I received with my

rejected application on November 19, 1990 is attached as Exhibit 5.

- of my signature had caused the Clerk's rejection of the motion, and without any further modification or augmentation of the motion in explanation of the latest mishap, on November 20, 1990 I sent the papers back to the Clerk of the Court. Apparently, these papers were filed on November 21, 1990. A true and correct copy of the motion that was filed is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.
- g. On November 16, 1990 my office received a copy of the Order of Magistrate Eick ordering the deposition of David Miscavige to go forward. A true and correct copy of this Order is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.
- entire week through November 30 because I was in 15 noticed depositions from Hollister to Crescent City, California to Grants Pass, Oregon, in Harrah v. Del Norte Unified School District, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, No. C88 5121 RHS and my assistant, Sarah Van Hoey was still absent from work wrapping up the estate of her mother.
- 11. As soon as I returned from the week's depositions, I recommenced working close to around the clock on the opposition to defendants' summary judgment motion. I did not know whether the Court had ruled on the application and knew that the outstanding hearing date was December 3, 1990.
- 12. On December 3, 1990 I had not completed the opposition. At that time I was unaware of the Court's ruling denying the motion to continue. I knew that my efforts to obtain more time had repeatedly failed, ad initio, due to relatively minor technicalities, and hoped EXHIBIT A 092

Page 6. Plaintiffs' EX PARTE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT, OR RECONSIDERATION, OR FOR RECONSIDERATION

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that at least the Court was aware that I was trying to obtain more time and get plaintiffs' opposition on file. Thus, I continued to put all my heart, mind and soul into producing the opposition upon which I continued to work almost around the clock.

On December 4, 1990, I received notice that on November 28, 1990 the Court had issued its Order denying the motion to continue, 13. or in the alternative, for an enlargement of time, which Order was filed on November 29, and entered on November 30, 1990. A true and correct copy of said order is attached hereto as Exhibit 8.

Utterly dismayed, and recognizing, due to my failure to produce opposition, and/or to file a motion for more time, that plaintiffs were in default I continued to work exclusively on the opposition, almost around the clock. On December 4th or 5th, by telephone I notified Judy Hurley, Judge Ideman's clerk, that I knew I was in default, was very scared about it and was doing my best to deliver an opposition within the next day (which I was not able to do and did not).

Plaintiffs' opposition to the summary judgment has great The opposition shows that there are triable issues of merit. material fact as to each major issue in the case. Particularly with respect to the fact (1) that the Church Scientology is a unitary monolith all parts of which are controlled by a central hierarchy of persons known as the Sea Organization; (2) that Scientology made repeated specific and definite statements of existing fact to plaintiffs in its practice of employing fraud as a means to cause prospective and unwitting candidates for recruitment, including plaintiffs, to be exposed to coercive persuasion without their knowledge or consent, so that as a result they would become involved

EXHIBIT A

in Scientology; (3) that Scientology's treatment of the Aznarans, utilizing deception and coercion, constituted the intentional infliction of emotional distress and caused them loss of consortium. The omission of the other issues raised in the summary judgment motion does not mean they lack merit; the Court's attention is directed to what are the most important motions.

It is imperative that the Court consider plaintiffs' opposition because defendants' motion is cleverly couched so as to cause plaintiffs to have the appearance of having voluntarily participated in Scientology when, in fact, plaintiffs' involvement was the result of a sophisticated combination of fraud and undue influence/coercive persuasion.

The merits of plaintiffs' claims will be overlooked in the event that the Court were to rule on the motion for summary judgment without taking the substance of plaintiffs' opposition into consideration. This would result in a terrible injustice that would not be due to any fault of plaintiffs, but the sole responsibility for which should fall on me, their attorney.

faith. To date plaintiffs have successfully resisted the following substantive attacks on the pleadings and merits of the case: a motion to dismiss, a Rule 11 motion for sanctions (all brought prior to the disqualification of plaintiffs' former attorneys Cummins and White); a motion to dismiss, first motion for summary judgment, motion for preliminary injunction, interlocutory appeal of denial of motion for preliminary injunction (concerning which briefing is complete and matter is pending before the 9th Circuit) (all brought after the disqualification of Cummins and White and/or substitution of present

Page 8. Plaintiffs' ex parte motion for relief from Devault, or reconsideration, or for reconsideration

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counsel). Defendants have deposed Plaintiffs Vicki J. Aznaran for 11 days, and Richard N. Aznaran for 9 days in this matter alone; in addition to which both plaintiffs have been deposed for many additional days in RTC, et al. v. Yanny, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court, No. C 690211 and RTC v. Scott/Wollersheim, U.S. Court, Central District of California, No. CV 85-711 JMI (Bx)/No. 85-7197 JMI (Bx).

In light of the fact that this Court generally does not 16. entertain oral argument, and does not necessary rule on complex motions such as the herein motion for summary judgment on the date of hearing, defendants will not be prejudiced by the Court's issuance of an order relieving plaintiffs' from the onus of default. While I recognize that the delay my failure has caused interferes with this Court's expeditious administration of justice, if the Court were not to rule immediately on defendants' motion there would not appear to be any fatal harm to the administration of justice caused by relieving plaintiffs of their counsel's default. On the other hand, were the Court to consider defendants' second summary judgment motion without consideration of plaintiffs' opposition, the result as to the plaintiffs would most likely be fatal in that they would be deprived of a remedy for the 15 years of tortious mistreatment they received from the Church of Scientology; such would be an injustice. The fault is mine, not that of Vicki and Richard Aznaran. They should not be punished for my transgression.

Under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of California I hereby declare that the foregoing is true and correct according to my first-hand knowledge, except those matters stated to be on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them

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FORD GREENE, ESQUIRE 711 BIR FRANCIS DRIKE BOMEVAND BAN ANSELMO, CALIFORNIA 94850-1949 (415) 288-0350 14

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
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

On or about October 22, 1990 defendants 1 filed their 72 page Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment with a hearing date set for November 19, 1990. Thereafter, pursuant to stipulation and order the hearing date was continued to December 3, 1990 with November 13, 1990 as the date by which plaintiffs were to serve and file their opposition.

On November 9, 1990, Magistrate Charles F. Eick issued his order compelling the deposition of David Miscavige; plaintiffs' counsel did not receive notice thereof until November 16, 1990.

On November 10, 1990, the mother of Sarah Van Hoey, legal assistant to plaintiffs' counsel, died; plaintiffs' counsel, a sole practitioner, was without her able assistance for the following weeks while Ms. Van Hoey wrapped up her deceased mother's affairs.

On November 13, 1990 plaintiffs first attempted to deliver by courier an Ex Parte Application for Continuance of Hearing Date, Or, In The Alternative, for an Enlargement of Time To File Opposition To

Defendants and moving parties are the following corporate organizations: Author Services, Church of Inc., Spiritual Technology, Religious Technology Center, and Church of Scientology International. Said four corporate defendants will be collectively called "defendants."

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Motion for Summary Judgment to the Court for filing, but a power outage prevented the computer from printing the same in sufficient time to have the motion delivered from Northern California to Los Angeles. Thereafter, plaintiffs cause their Ex Parte Application to be transmitted to Los Angeles by facsimile but it was rejected by the Clerk because the signature of plaintiffs' counsel had also been transmitted by facsimile, and was not the original.

On November 14, 1990 plaintiffs sent their motion to the Clerk of the Court by Federal Express; this time the Clerk rejected the same because the proposed Order had not been signed by plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel received notice of the second rejection on November 19, 1990. On November 20, 1990, plaintiffs' counsel, having signed the proposed order, sent the motion and the order by Federal Express back to the Clerk who filed the same on November 21, 1990.

On or about November 21, 1990 defendants filed their Notice of Failure to File Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Sanctions.

On November 28, 1990 the Honorable James M. Ideman denied plaintiffs' ex parte application, his order was filed on November 29, and entered on November 30, 1990. Plaintiffs' counsel received the Court's order on December 4, 1990.

The instant motion is brought on behalf of plaintiffs for an order relieving them from default and allowing them to file their memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment as well as the other papers in support thereof, or, in the alternative, for reconsideration of its Order denying a continuance of the date for hearing the summary judgment motion until the deposition of David

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BAN ANBELMO, CALIFORNIA 94900-1949

HUBLAW OFFICES
FORD GREENE, ESQUIRE
711 SIR FRANCIS DRANE BOLLEWARD

ARGUMENT

II.

PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO FILE AN OPPOSITION THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE EXCUSED

BECAUSE IT IS THE RESULT OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT

F.R.C.P. Rule 1, in pertinent part, states, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." F.R.C.P. Rule 6(b)(2) states that when "by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court may for cause shown at any given time in its discretion . . . upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." Local Rule 7.3.2 controls the enlargement of time by court order after the expiration of time provided.

Rule 6(b) is a rule of general application giving wide discretion to the court. Beaufort Concrete Company v. Atlantic States Construction Co. (5th Cir. 1965) 352 F.2d 460, 462. Most courts take a liberal view as to the breadth of such discretion Yonofsky v. Wernick (S.D.N.Y. 1973) 362 F.Supp. 1005, 1014, "in order to work substantial justice." Id. at 1012.

The burden is on the moving party to establish that the failure to timely act was the result of "excusable neglect." The moving party must demonstrate good faith and must show some reasonable basis for noncompliance within the time specified by the rules. <u>Thid.</u> What is considered to be excusable neglect "should depend in part upon the

EXHIBITA 098

Page 12. PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEPAULT, OR RECONSIDERATION, OR FOR RECONSIDERATION

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importance of the matter involved and the prejudice, if any, to the other party." Ham v. Smith (D.C. Cir. 1981) 653 F.2d 628, 630, fn 7 quoting Coadv v. Aquadilla Terminal Inc. (1st Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 677, 678. Whether the neglect is excusable rests with the sound discretion of the district court. Davidson v. Keenan (2d Cir. 1984) 740 F.2d 129, 132.

In order to justify a finding of excusable neglect under Rule 6(b)(2) requires both a demonstration of good faith by the party seeking the enlargement and it must also appear that there was a reasonable basis for not complying within the specified period. Additionally, there must be no prejudice caused from any enlargement of time granted. In Re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation v. Bank of America (10th Cir. 1974) 493 F.2d 1288, 1290.

Plaintiffs recognize, as they must, that the fact that the mere fact their counsel "is a solo practitioner and was engaged in the preparation of other cases" does not constitute excusable neglect. McGlaughlin v. City of LaGrange (11th Cir. 1981) 662 F.2d 1385, 1387. Similarly, simply because an attorney "claims that he has been involved in a criminal appeal . . . is a sole practitioner and carries a full teaching load at a local law school, and has been unable - for financial reasons - to obtain needed technical assistance or anticipated pro bono support" does not mean a failure to make a timely filing constitutes excusable neglect. Television Network, Inc. v. Early (D.C. Cir. 1983) 713 F.2d 837, 838. In <u>Mawhinney v. Heckler</u> (D.C. Maine 1985) 600 F.Supp. 783, 784-785, the court found there was no excusable neglect where no effort had been made to file for an extension of time within the time the opposition to the summary judgment motion was due and the only reason EXHIBIT 099

Page 13. PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT, OR RECONSIDERATION, OR FOR RECONSIDERATION

provided for the failure to make a timely filing by the Secretary of Health and Human Services was due to "a backlog of cases."

McGlaughlin, Marquee, and Mawhinney, however, are distinguishable from the instant case. In McGlaughlin, no effort was made to obtain an extension of time before the expiration of the time to respond.

In <u>Marquee</u>, counsel not only filed to file his client's brief on time, he also failed to respond to an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed and did not even seek an extension of time for filing said papers. In <u>Mawhinnev</u>, no effort was made to obtain an extension of time prior to the time the opposition was due.

In the instant case, counsel diligently, although with defects, attempted to obtain additional time to file his clients' brief.

Additionally, in the instant case, plaintiffs' counsel was severely impaired by the absence from work of his most capable assistant, upon whom he greatly relied, due to the death of her mother.

Finally, in both McGlaughlin and Marquee the courts did not make the client pay the price for the inaction of their respective counsel. Likewise, in the instant case, while the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel should not in any way be sanctioned because it has interfered with the administration of justice and the reasonable expectations of defendants, it has not prejudiced defendants. Similarly, while the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel has been untimely, said untimeliness has not been the result of any tactical scheme undertaken in bad faith.

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PLAINTIPPS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO FILE A BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 35 PAGES

Local Rule 3.10 states that no brief shall exceed 35 pages in length. In the instant case, defendants' brief was 72 pages in length. Thus, in the event that the Court allows plaintiffs to file their opposing papers, it is only fair to allow plaintiffs to file a memorandum in excess of 35 pages as well.

IV.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD GRANT RECONSIDERATION

OF ITS DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO CONTINUE ON THE BASIS THAT

THE DEPOSITION OF DAVID MISCAVIGE WAS ORDERED AFTER

PLAINTIFFS HAD SUBMITTED THEIR MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION

Local Rule 7.16 authorizes a motion for reconsideration if it based upon a material difference in fact from that presented to the Court that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been known to the moving party at the time of the decision.

The motion for a continuance of the hearing date on the motion for summary judgment was predicated upon papers that were drafted and served on November 14, 1990. One ground upon which the continuance was sought was predicated upon the then possibility that Magistrate Eick would order the deposition of David Miscavige, the top leader in the Church of Scientology. Subsequent to the drafting of said motion, plaintiffs' counsel received notice from the Court that the deposition of David Miscavige had been ordered.

Plaintiffs expect to obtain substantial testimony from Mr. Miscavige on the issue of the nature and extent of his control within the Church of Scientology, specifically his exercise of authority across corporate boundaries as a regular course of business practice.

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since the deposition of Mr. Miscavige had not to plaintiffs' knowledge been ordered at the time the motion to continue was submitted to the Court, the fact that said deposition has been ordered is a basis for the Court to reconsider its prior denial of the motion to continue.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully requested that the Court grant Plaintiffs relief from default and allow the filing of their papers in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, the Court grant reconsideration of Plaintiffs' motion that the Court denied by the Order entered on November 30, 1990.

Respectfully submitted:

DATED: December 10, 1990

HUB CAW OFFICES

FURD GREENE

Attorney for Plaintiffs

RICHARD N. and VICKI J. AZNARAN

EXHIBIT A

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EXHIBIT T

address is: fore said court and, heraby petition the above-entitled court to admit me to practice be-Cali fornia 94960-1949 (Print name as it should appear on certificate) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA FORD GREENE PETITION BY ATTORNEY FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE in support of my petition, state my business Francis Drake Blvd., , telephone # (415) 258-0360. Cert iss'd (State Bar No.) 107601 (Init.)

court of the State of California. Other courts to which I am admitted to practice and dates of admission are: U.S. Dist Court, Norther I do hereby certify that I have read the Local Rules of Practice, the Local Criminal Rules, the FRCive, the FRCrime, and the FREvid to practice and dates of admission are: District of California: January March 17, 1983, I was admirted to practice before the Supreme 1985 Northern

Signature of Patitioner, their entirety. FORD GREENE the FRCrimp, and the FREvid,

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and correct copy of the actifaction life in that the to:e-ping comment & my office, and in the state restorie I hereby classic as certify on

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CERTIFICATE OF SPONSOR

THURSDAYS ONLY, BUT NOT ON TUESDAYS FOLLOW BY A MONDAY HOLIDAY. on Thursday, February 29, 11989, at 9:15 a.m. is of good moral character and is alm District of California, that I (Day) \$6.05 9.00 the er (Date) sknow the petitioner whose name is Deputy Clerk initials: Cyfudo shereby certify that I am Signature of Sponsor . District Court, Central the Bar of the State platition herein. petitioner